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VIEWPOINT
Limiting The Role Of Patents In Technology Transfer
Rebecca S. Eisenberg*
In 1980, Congress passed the StevenFederal policy since 1980 has reflected
son-Wydler Innovation Act, which made
an increasingly confident presumption
technology transfer an integral part of
that patenting discoveries made in the
course of government-sponsored rethe research and development responsisearch is the most effective way to probilities of federal laboratories and their
employees, and the Bayh-Dole Act,
mote technology transfer and commercial
which reversed the prior practice of
development of those discoveries in the
some agencies of retaining public ownerprivate sector. Whereas policymakers in
ship of discoveries made
the past may have
through federal research
thought that the best way
funding in universities and
to achieve widespread use
small businesses (see Auof government-sponsored
research was to make the
gust 1993 issue, page 45).
results freely available to
Later legislative enactthe public, the new proments and executive orpatent policy stresses the
ders have broadened and
need for exclusive rights
tightened the provisions
as an incentive for indusof the Bayh-Dole and
try to undertake the furStevenson-Wydler Acts
wherever loopholes have
ther investment to bring
appeared that might leave
new products to market.
Although this propotentially valuable dispatent policy may make a
coveries unpatented.
good deal of sense for Rebecca S. Eisenberg is a
Under the system we
some government-spon- professor of law at the Uni- have in place today, whersored discoveries, there versity of Michigan Law
ever federally sponsored
are reasons to suspect School in Ann Arbor; Mich. inventions are made,
that it makes little sense
whether in government,
for others. In our eageruniversity, or private laboness to avoid the inadequacies of the
ratories, if anyone involved in the republic-domain approach, we may have
search project wants the discovery to be
moved too quickly and too emphatically
patented, chances are it will be patented.
in the opposite direction, to the point
Thus, for example, if a government agenthat patent rights in some governmentcy or university has no interest in pursusponsored discoveries may actually be
ing patent rights in a discovery, the
undermining, rather than supporting,
individual investigator who made the disincentives to develop new products and
covery may step in and claim them.
bring them to market. It is time to
Now, all of this makes a good deal of
reevaluate the role of patents in techsense if we want all government-sponnology transfer-on the basis of more
sored research discoveries to be patentthan a decade of actual experience
ed. But do we?
rather than uncorroborated fears-and
One sign of trouble in paradise for
consider how the present system might
federal technology-transfer policy is the
be improved.
reaction of industry trade groups to the
filing of patent applications in 1991 by
*University of Michigan Law School, Hutchins Hall,
NIH on thousands of partial complemenAnn Arbor, MI 48109. Responses intended for publitary DNA (eDNA) sequences of uncation should be addressed to THE JoURNAL OF NIH
RESEARCH, 1444 I Street, N.W., Suite 1000, Washingknown function. These trade groups are
ton, DC 20005, This article was adapted from renot composed of naive, idealistic scienmarks presented to the Congressional Biomedical
Research Caucus in Washington, D.C., June 28, 1993.
tists who have limited experience with
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patents and limited interest in product
development. Their members are the
same hard-nosed, profit-maximizing
firms that Congress is trying to entice
into developing products out of government-sponsored inventions through
its patent policy.
Position statements from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(PMA) and from two biotechnology trade
groups that have since merged, the Industrial Biotechnology Association (IBA)
and the Association of Biotechnology
Companies (ABC), contradicted the hypothesis that patents on eDNA sequences
are necessary to protect the interests of
firms that might develop related products
in the future. PMA and IBA both urged
that NIH not seek patent protection on
eDNA sequences whose biological function is unknown. ABC supported the NIH
decision to seek patent protection, but
only as a means of generating revenues
for the government. Indeed, even ABC
urged that the patents be licensed on a
nonexclusive basis so as not to block development projects in industry.
These reactions to the eDNA patent
applications alone are enough to call into
question the strong pro-patent tilt of current policy. It may be that under current
law NIH had little choice but to pursue
patent rights, but I am at least tentatively persuaded that later product development would probably be better served by
leaving the sequence information in the
public domain. This seems to suggest at
the very least that federal agencies ought
to have more flexibility to determine that
some inventions would be better left in
the public domain.
Can we say anything more specific
than that at this point? One way of approaching that question is to consider
how it is that patents are supposed to
promote product development in order
to identify circumstances in which the
patenting strategy is unlikely to work.
The argument for patenting research
discoveries as a means of promoting

their later development into useful products is that patents permit the firms that
invest in product development to reap
the rewards of their investment through
commercially effective monopolies. That
argument is generally true when a company obtains a patent on an end product
that is sold to consumers.
Somewhat less effective are process
patents covering a specific use of an unpatented product. The trouble with these
so-called use patents is that as long as
there are other uses for the product that
are not covered by the patent, the patent
holder cannot stop competitors from selling the unpatented product itself and
thereby driving down its price. If the
product is available from a variety of
sources, it may be impossible to monitor
what purchasers are using it for.
Another, even less effective, type of
patent covers starting materials or processes used in making an unpatented end
product. Such patents do not prevent a
competitor from making the product from
different materials or through a different
process, or even from using the patented
materials overseas and then importing
the end product into the United States.
Such a patent may also be difficult to enforce because of the practical problems
involved in detecting and proving infringement in the manufacturing process.
Weaker still, as a device to keep competitors out of the market, is a patent
covering products or processes that are
used only during product development.
Not only is it difficult to detect and
prove infringement of such a patent, but
often the only effective remedy will be
monetary damages because an injunction against future use of the invention
will not thwart the efforts of a competitor who has already finished using it.
So firms that are interested in developing end products for sale to consumers are unlikely to see patents on
research tools as a very effective means
of protecting their market exclusivity.
Such patents may generate royalty income, and that prospect may make it
profitable to develop further research
tools in the private sector, but patents
are unlikely to enhance the incentives of
firms to develop end products through
the use of those research tools.
On the other hand, one firm's research
tool may be another firm's end product.
This is particularly so in the contemporary biotechnology industry, in which research is big business, and there is money
to be made by developing and marketing
22
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research tools for use by other firms. For
example, even as PMA and IBA were calling on NIH to dedicate its eDNA sequence information to the public, new
firms were being formed to do further
eDNA sequencing in the private sector,
presumably with the hope of obtaining
their own patent rights. It may well make
sense to have this particular task performed in the private sector, and patents
may enhance the incentives of firms to
step in and do it. On the other hand, it
may make more sense to leave this information in the public domain, even if that
means that the government has to continue to bear the cost of generating it.
There are reasons to be wary of
patents on research tools. Competing

Patent rights in some
governmentsponsored
discoveries may actually be
undermining, rather than
supporting, incentives to
develop new products and
bring them to market.
firms may hesitate to request licenses for
fear of revealing the directions of their
own research. Moreover, a large research
project might require access to a great
many research tools; if each of these
tools requires a separate license and royalty payment, the costs and administrative burden could mount quickly.
Another danger is that a company might
refuse to make a patented research tool
available to competitors at any price. Or,
patent holders might find it more lucrative to license research-tool patents on
an exclusive rather than a nonexclusive
basis, in the process choking off the research and development of other firms.
Basic-research activities might also be
affected. For years, this country has sustained a flourishing biomedical-research
enterprise, in which investigators have
drawn heavily on discoveries that their
predecessors left in the public domain.
Even if exclusive rights enhance private
incentives to develop further research
tools, they could do significant harm to
the overall research enterprise by inhibiting the effective use of existing ones.
Research tools may therefore be one
example of the sort of discovery for
which exclusive rights do more harm

than good. There are undoubtedly others
as well. Certain fundamental inventions
with a wide range of applications may be
more effectively exploited if left in the
public domain or otherwise made freely
available to all than if patented and licensed on an exclusive basis. The absence of patent protection on fundamental techniques for producing hybridomas
and monoclonal antibodies does not seem
to have significantly retarded the development and patenting of commercial
products using those technologies.
The time is ripe to take a critical look
at the actual operation of our technology-transfer policy over the past decade
and see how well it is working. This task
calls for more than an examination of aggregate statistics on the percentage of
patented inventions that have been licensed. It would be useful to know
whether those inventions have led to the
development of commercial products,
and whether those products are protected by other patents that would provide a
comparable degree of market exclusivity
even if the government-sponsored invention had been left in the public domain. It
would be useful to know what effect
those patents have had on the research
and development of competitors of the
licensee or on other would-be licensees
who did not win the exclusive license.
The rhetoric surrounding federal
technology-transfer policy suggests that
whatever is good for industry must be in
the public interest. This is a vast oversimplification of the issue. The private
sector responds to the profit incentives
created by whatever policies the government puts in place. Whenever the
government offers new property rights,
one would expect someone to step forward to claim them. It doesn't necessarily follow that those property rights are
on balance creating new social value
that will make all of us better off.
I believe that patents have a critical
role to play in promoting technology
transfer. But the incentives created by
patent rights in government-sponsored
inventions would do little to compensate
for the damage we could do to our research enterprise if we allocate too
much of our new knowledge to private
owners and too little to the public domain. Government is uniquely situated
to enrich our public domain. We should
be wary of disabling the government
from performing this critical function in
our eagerness to enhance private incentives to put existing discoveries to use.l

